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Abstract
I characterise R&D investment in product innovation of a pro…t-seeking mo-
nopolist versus that of a social planner in a spatial market, under either
partial or full market coverage. Under partial coverage, the steady state
product design is the outcome of the tradeo¤ between the incentive to locate
as close as possible to the middle of the preference space, and the incentive
to save upon R&D costs. The planner does not produce the variety pre-
ferred by the average consumer, in situations where the R&D investment is
too costly. This result is reinforced under full market coverage, where the
planner’s incentive to innovate is always weaker than the monopolist’s, and
the planner produces the average (and median) consumer’s preferred variety
if and only if the rental price of capital is nil.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of dynamic monopoly dates back to Evans (1924) and Tintner
(1937), who analysed the pricing behaviour of a …rm subject to a U-shaped
variable cost curve.1 The analysis of intertemporal capital accumulation
appeared later on (see Eisner and Strotz, 1963, inter alia).
The existing literature investigates several features of monopoly markets,
in particular several forms of discrimination, either through (intertemporal)
pricing (see Stokey, 1981; Bulow, 1982; Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson, 1986)
or through product proliferation (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Maskin and
Riley, 1984; Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton and Thisse, 1986; Bonanno, 1987).
A dynamic model of durable-good monopoly with capital accumulation in
continuous time is in Kamien and Schwartz (1979).
Another dynamic tool which has received a considerable amount of at-
tention is advertising, ever since Vidale and Wolfe (1957) and Nerlove and
Arrow (1962).2 A taxonomy introduced by Sethi (1977) distinguishes be-
tween advertising capital models and sales-advertising response models. The
…rst category considers advertising as an investment in a stock of goodwill,
à la Nerlove-Arrow. The second category gathers models where there exists
a direct relationship between the rate of change in sales and advertising, à la
Vidale-Wolfe.
1See Chiang (1992) for a recent exposition of the original model by Evans, as well as
later developments.
2For exhaustive surveys, see Sethi (1977); Jørgensen (1982); Feichtinger and Jørgensen
(1983); Erickson (1991); Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi (1994). For duopoly models with
dynamic pricing and advertising, see in particular Leitmann and Schmitendorf (1978), and
Feichtinger (1983).
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A wide attention has been devoted to the issue of optimal product design
in static models of product di¤erentiation, be that either horizontal (Bo-
nanno, 1987) or vertical (Spence, 1975; Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Maskin and
Riley, 1984; Gabszewicz, Shaked, Sutton and Thisse, 1986). According to
these contributions, a pro…t-seeking monopolist designs the product to …t
the taste of the marginal consumer, while a benevolent planner aiming at
the maximization of social welfare takes into account the taste of the average
consumer. Therefore, whenever the marginal willingness to pay of the aver-
age consumer is higher (lower) than the marginal consumer’s, we observe a
downward (upward) distortion in the equilibrium design of the product. A
situation where this does not happen is the horizontal di¤erentiation model
à la Hotelling (1929) investigated by Bonanno (1987), where all consumers
have the same gross surplus. Consequently, the …rm locates in the middle of
the product space irrespective of her objective function.
In this paper, I propose a monopoly model where the …rm locates the
product in a spatial market representing the space of consumer preferences,
as in Hotelling (1929). The location of the product in the space of consumer
preferences depends upon the R&D investment carried out by the …rm over
time, according to a technology characterised by decreasing returns.
The analysis is carried out under the alternative assumptions of partial
and full market coverage. In the …rst case, the steady state product design is
the outcome of the tradeo¤ between the incentive to locate as close as possible
to the middle of the preference space, and the incentive to save upon R&D
costs. The planner does not produce the variety preferred by the average
consumer, in situations where the R&D investment is too costly.
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This conclusion emerges even more clearly from the full coverage frame-
work, where the planner’s incentive to invest in product innovation is always
weaker than the monopolist’s, and the planner produces the average (and
median) consumer’s preferred variety if and only if the rental price of capital
is nil.
Hence, in general, there are situations where the R&D e¤ort needed to
meet the tastes of the average consumer is socially too expensive while, on
the contrary, the monopolist …nds it convenient to locate her product in
the middle of the preference space in order to maximise the extraction of
surplus from consumers. An ancillary but relevant corollary is that, whenever
the monopolist’s variety is closer to the average consumer taste than the
planner’s, the extent of market coverage at the steady state is larger under
monopoly than under social planning. Therefore, while it is certainly true
that welfare is higher under planning than under monopoly, this happens
because of a smaller R&D e¤ort in product innovation rather than a larger
production and/or a more e¢cient location of the product in the admissible
spectrum of varieties.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The setup is laid out
in section 2. The behaviour of the planner and the monopolist under partial
market coverage is illustrated in section 3. Section 4 contains a comparative
evaluation of their performances in steady state. The full market coverage
setting is investigated in section 5, and the comparative assessment of so-
cial planning and monopoly is in section 6. Section 7 contains concluding
remarks.
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2 The model
The setup shares its basic features with Bonanno (1987). I consider a market
for horizontally di¤erentiated products where consumers are uniformly dis-
tributed with unit density along the unit interval [0; 1]. Let the market exist
over t 2 [0;1): The market is served by a …rm selling a single good, located
at x(t) 2 [1=2; 1]: This assumption is justi…ed by the symmetry of the model
around 1/2. The initial condition is x(0) = 1; and the …rm may modify its
location over time according to the following dynamics of the state variable:3
@x(t)
@t
= ¡ k(t)
1 + k(t)
¢ x(t) ; (1)
where k(t) is the R&D e¤ort carried out by the …rm at time t: Observe that
technology (1) exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
The generic consumer located at a(t) 2 [0; 1] buys one unit of the good,
if net surplus from purchase is non-negative:
U(t) = s¡ p(t)¡ [x(t)¡ a(t)]2 ¸ 0; i = 1; 2; (2)
where p(t) is the …rm’s mill price, and s is gross consumer surplus, that is,
the reservation price that a generic consumer is willing to pay for the good.
Therefore, s can be considered as a preference parameter which, together
with the disutility of transportation, yields a measure of consumers’ taste for
the good.
Two alternative situations may arise:
3A stochastic R&D race for product innovation in a Hotelling duopoly with quadratic
disutility of transportation is investigated by Harter (1993).
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[1 ] Partial market coverage (pmc) : The mill price is such that marginal
consumer located at m(t) 2 (0 ; x(t))enjoys zero surplus, that is,
p(t) = s¡ [x(t)¡m(t)]2 (3)
This gives rise to a market demand equal to:
y(t) = 1¡m(t) : (4)
[2 ] Full market coverage (fmc) : The reservation price s is su¢ciently
high to allow for the …rm to serve all consumers, so that demand is
y(t) = 1: In such a case, for all x(t) 2
·
1
2
; 1
¸
; the monopoly price is
p(t) = s ¡ [x(t)]2 :
I assume that the …rm operates at constant marginal production cost, and,
for the sake of simplicity, I normalise it to zero.4 Therefore, instantaneous
pro…ts are:
¼(t) = p(t)y(t) =
8<:
£
s¡ (x(t)¡m(t))2¤ [1¡m(t)]¡ ½k(t) under pmc
s¡ [x(t)]2 ¡ ½k(t) under fmc
(5)
where ½ is the rental price of capital, assumed to be equal to the discount
rate. Instantaneous consumer surplus is:
CS(t) =
Z 1
m(t)
£
s¡ p(t)¡ (x(t)¡ a(t))2¤ da(t) = (6)
=
£
1¡ (m(t))2¤ [3x(t)m(t)¡ 2m(t)¡ 1]
3
4The properties of capital accumulation for both advertising and production in a similar
monopoly setting are investigated in Lambertini (2000).
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under partial market coverage. Instantaneous social welfare under partial
coverage amounts to
SW (t) = ¼(t) + CS(t) : (7)
Under full market coverage, the (inverse) measure of social welfare is given
by the integral of transportation costs over the population of consumers:
TC(t) =
Z 1
0
[x(t)¡ a(t)]2 da(t) = [x(t)]2 ¡ x(t) + 1
3
: (8)
Notice that, on the basis of (8), the social planner can set any price p(t) 2£
0 ; s ¡ (x(t))2¤ :
3 Product development under partial market
coverage
3.1 Socially optimal R&D
In scenario 1, the objective of a benevolent social planner is
max
a(t)
Z 1
0
e¡½tSW (t)dt =
Z 1
0
e¡½t
(£
1¡ (m(t))2¤ [3x(t)m(t)¡ 2m(t)¡ 1]
3
+
+
£
s¡ (x(t)¡m(t))2¤ [1¡m(t)]¡ ½k(t)ª dt (9)
s:t:
@x(t)
@t
= ¡ k(t)
1 + k(t)
¢ x(t) (10)
where ½ denotes time discounting. In choosing the optimal location of the
marginal consumer(s) at any t; the planner indeed maximises discounted
social welfare w.r.t. output (or, alternatively, price). The corresponding
Hamiltonian function is:
H(t) = e¡½t ¢
(£
1¡ (m(t))2¤ [3x(t)m(t)¡ 2m(t)¡ 1]
3
+ (11)
6
+
£
s¡ (x(t)¡m(t))2¤ [1¡m(t)]¡ ½k(t)¡ ¸(t) k(t)
1 + k(t)
¢ x(t)
¾
;
where ¸(t) = ¯(t)e½t; ¯(t) being the co-state variable associated to k(t): The
necessary and su¢cient conditions for a path to be optimal are:
@H(t)
@m(t)
= [m(t)]2 + 2m(t)x(t) + [x(t)]2 2¡ s = 0 ; (12)
@H(t)
@k(t)
= ¡½ ¡ ¸(t)
[1 + k(t)]2
¢ x(t) = 0 ; (13)
¡@H(t)
@x(t)
=
@¯(t)
@t
) (14)
@¸(t)
@t
=
·
½+
k(t)
1 + k(t)
¸
¸(t)¡ [1¡m(t)] [3 + 3m(t)¡ 6x(t)]
3
;
lim
t!1
¯(t) ¢ x(t) = 0 : (15)
From (12), I obtain5
m(t) = x(t)¡ ps (16)
with m(t) smaller than x(t) for all positive s; and m(t) > 0 for all x(t) 2
(1=2; 1] i¤ s < 1=4:
From (13), I obtain
¸(t) = ¡½ [1 + k(t)]
2
x(t)
(17)
and
k(t) = ¡1 + 1p
½
p
¡¸(t)x(t) (18)
which allows me to write the following dynamics of capital accumulation:
@k(t)
@t
=
1
2
p¡½¸(t)x(t)
½
¡@¸(t)
@t
x(t)¡ @x(t)
@t
¸(t)
¾
(19)
5Recall that m(t) < x(t) 2 (1=2; 1] ; so that the other solution to (12) can be excluded.
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which in turn entails:
@k(t)
@t
_ ¡@¸(t)
@t
x(t)¡ @x(t)
@t
¸(t) : (20)
Using (14) and (17), condition (13) rewrites as follows:
@k(t)
@t
_ ½2 [1 + k(t)]2 + x(t) [1¡m(t)] [1 +m(t)¡ 2x(t)] : (21)
The roots of the expression on the r.h.s. of (21) are:
k(t) = ¡1§
p
x(t) [1¡m(t)] [2x(t)¡ 1 +m(t)]
½
(22)
and using (16):
k(t) = ¡1§
p
x(t) fs¡ 1 + x(t) [2¡ x(t)]g
½
: (23)
First notice that obviously the negative root can be excluded. Secondly,
observe that
k(t) 2 R+ for all x(t) 2 £1¡ ps ; 1 +ps¤ : (24)
If condition (24) does not hold, then @k(t)=@t is always positive. The fore-
going discussion produces:
Lemma 1 For all x(t) 2 [1¡ ps ; 1 +ps] ; the socially optimal R&D in-
vestment in steady state is:
kssSP = ¡1 +
p
x(t) fs¡ 1 + x(t) [2¡ x(t)]g
½
; (25)
with the intuitive properties:
@kssSP
@s
> 0 ;
@kssSP
@½
< 0 :
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Superscript ss stands for steady state while subscript SP stands for social
planning. From (22), I also obtain that kssSP = 0 at
6
x(t) =
1¡ [m(t)]2 +
q
[1¡m(t)]©1 + 8½2 ¡m(t) £(m(t))2 +m(t)¡ 1¤ª
4 [1¡m(t)]
(26)
while, from (25), kssSP = 0 at
7
xssSP =
2
3
Ã
1 +
1 + 3s+ 3
p
2-
3
p
4-
!
(27)
where
- ´ 18s¡ 2¡ 27½2 + 3
q
3
£
½2 (4 + 27½2 ¡ 36s)¡ 4s (1¡ s)2¤ : (28)
Some tedious but easy algebra is necessary to verify the following results:
² At x(0) = 1; kssSP =
p
s¡ ½
½
> 0 for all s > ½2 :
² kssSP = 0 at xssSP =
2
3
Ã
1 +
1 + 3s+ 3
p
2-
3
p
4-
!
2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
for all s 2·
½2;
8½2 + 1
4
¶
:
² kssSP = 0 at xssSP =
1
2
, for s =
8½2 + 1
4
:
² kssSP = ¡1 +
1
2½
r
4s¡ 1
2
at x(t) =
1
2
, for all s >
8½2 + 1
4
:
The above can be summarised by:
6The smaller root can be disregarded as it is always negative.
7The other two roots can be disregarded as they are both complex.
9
Proposition 1 For all s 2
·
½2;
8½2 + 1
4
¶
; the social planning problem ad-
mits a unique steady state equilibrium where kssSP = 0 at x
ss
SP 2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
:
Examine now the extent of market coverage in steady state. This is
(inversely) measured by mssSP = x
ss
SP ¡
p
s: Now recall that m(t) > 0 for all
s 2
µ
0;
1
4
¶
; and observe that
8½2 + 1
4
>
1
4
for all ½ > 0: This yields the
following Corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 For all ½ > 0 and s 2
·
½2 ;
8½2 + 1
4
¶
; kssSP = 0 at x
ss
SP 2µ
1
2
; 1
¸
; and mssSP 2 (0 ; xssSP ) : Partial market coverage obtains.
For ½ = 0 and s =
1
4
; in steady state
½
kssSP = 0 ; x
ss
SP =
1
2
; mssSP = 0
¾
:
Full market coverage obtains as an internal solution.
For all ½ > 0 and s >
8½2 + 1
4
; in steady state kssSP > 0 ; with x =
1
2
and
m = 0 : Full market coverage obtains as a corner solution.
The R&D behaviour and the resulting optimal location choice of the
planner are illustrated in …gure 1, describing the case s 2
·
½2 ;
8½2 + 1
4
¶
. The
dynamics of x(t) and k(t) are summarised by horizontal and vertical arrows,
respectively. This also su¢ces to show that, whenever xssSP 2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
; then
it is a saddle.
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Figure 1 : Dynamics in the space (x(t); k(t))
6
- x(t)0
1/2
k(t)
x(0) = 1xssSP
@k(t)
@t
= 0
¾ 6
¾
?
3.2 Optimal R&D in a pro…t-seeking monopoly
The objective of the monopolist is
max
a(t)
Z 1
0
e¡½t¼(t)dt =
Z 1
0
e¡½t
©£
s¡ (x(t)¡m(t))2¤ [1¡m(t)]¡ ½k(t)ª dt
(29)
s:t:
@k(t)
@t
= f(k(t)) ¡ q(t)¡ ±k(t) (30)
where ½ denotes the same time discounting as for the planner. The corre-
sponding Hamiltonian function is:
H(t) = e¡½t ¢
½£
s¡ (x(t)¡m(t))2¤ [1¡m(t)]¡ ½k(t)¡ ¸(t) k(t)
1 + k(t)
¢ x(t)
¾
;
(31)
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where, again, ¸(t) = ¯(t)e½t; and ¯(t) is the co-state variable associated to
k(t):
The solution to the monopolist’s problem is largely analogous to that of
the planner as illustrated in section 3.1. The …rst order conditions are:
@H(t)
@m(t)
= 3 [m (t)]2 ¡ 2 [1 + 2x (t)]m (t) + [x (t)]2 ¡ 2x(t)¡ s = 0 ; (32)
@H(t)
@k(t)
= ¡½ ¡ ¸(t)
[1 + k(t)]2
¢ x(t) ; (33)
¡@H(t)
@x(t)
=
@¯(t)
@t
) (34)
@¸(t)
@t
=
·
½+
k(t)
1 + k(t)
¸
¸(t) + 2 fx(t)¡m(t) [1 +m(t) + x(t)]g ;
lim
t!1
¯(t) ¢ x(t) = 0 : (35)
Condition (32) yields
m(t) =
1 + 2x(t)¡
q
[1¡ x(t)]2 + 3s
3
; (36)
while from condition (33) I obtain qualitatively the same dynamics for the
R&D e¤ort as observed under planning:
@k(t)
@t
_ ¡@¸(t)
@t
x(t)¡ @x(t)
@t
¸(t) ; (37)
which rewrites as follows:
@k(t)
@t
_ ½2 [1 + k(t)]2 ¡ x(t) [x(t)¡m(t)] [1¡m(t)] : (38)
The roots of the expression on the r.h.s. of (38) are:
k(t) = ¡1§
p
2x(t) [x(t)¡m(t)] [1¡m(t)]
½
: (39)
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The negative root can obviously be disregarded, so that the optimal R&D
e¤ort in steady state is:
kssM = ¡1 +
p
2x(t) [x(t)¡m(t)] [1¡m(t)]
½
; (40)
where subscript M stands for monopoly.8 Moreover,
kssM = 0 , x(t) =
m(t)§
s
[m(t)]2 +
2½2
[1¡m(t)]
2
(41)
which obviously entails:
xssM =
m(t) +
s
[m(t)]2 +
2½2
[1¡m(t)]
2
: (42)
By using (36) and (40), the following properties can be shown to hold:
² At x(0) = 1; kssM = ¡1 +
1
½
r
2
3
s > 0 for all s >
3
2
½2 :
² kssM = 0 at xssM =
m(t) +
s
[m(t)]2 +
2½2
[1¡m(t)]
2
2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
for all s 2"
3
2
½2 ; min
(
5
4
;
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
)!
:
² kssM = 0 at xssM =
1
2
, for s = min
(
5
4
;
24½2 + 1¡
p
16½2 + 1
8
)
:
² kssM = ¡1 +
1
6½
p
12s¡ 1 +p12s+ 1 at x(t) = 1
2
, for all
s > min
(
5
4
;
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
)
:
8The optimal capital level under monopoly, kssM ; can be rewritten as a function of
fx(t); s; ½g only. However, this expression is cumbersome and therefore it is omitted.
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The above can be summarised by:
Proposition 2 For all s 2
"
3
2
½2 ; min
(
5
4
;
24½2 + 1¡
p
16½2 + 1
8
)!
; the
monopoly problem admits a unique steady state equilibrium where kssM = 0 at
xssM 2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
:
In order to characterise the extent of market coverage in steady state,
observe that, from (36), m(t) > 0 for all s 2
µ
0 ;
5
4
¶
; with
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
<
5
4
for all ½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
;
24½2 + 1¡
p
16½2 + 1
8
¸ 5
4
for all ½ ¸
p
2
2
:
(43)
Therefore, we have the following Corollary to Proposition 2:
Corollary 2 For all ½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
and s 2
"
3
2
½2 ;
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
!
;
kssM = 0 at x
ss
M 2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
; and mssM 2 (0 ; xssM ) : Partial market coverage ob-
tains.
For all ½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
and s 2
"
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
;
5
4
!
; kssM > 0 at
xssM =
1
2
; and mssM 2 (0 ; xssM) : Partial market coverage obtains.
For all ½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
and s ¸ 5
4
; kssM > 0 at x
ss
M =
1
2
; mssM = 0 : Full
market coverage obtains.
For ½ =
p
2
2
and s =
5
4
; in steady state
½
kssSP = 0 ; x
ss
SP =
1
2
; mssSP = 0
¾
:
Full market coverage obtains as an internal solution.
For all ½ >
p
2
2
and s >
5
4
; in steady state kssSP > 0 ; with x =
1
2
and
m = 0 : Full market coverage obtains as a corner solution.
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The dynamic analysis in the space fx(t) ; k(t)g shows that, whenever
xssM 2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
; then it is a saddle. The phase diagram is qualitatively equiv-
alent to …gure 1.
4 Planning vs monopoly under partial mar-
ket coverage
The above analysis can be summarised so as to give a comparative evaluation
of the planner’s and the monopolist’s behaviour, as follows. First of all, the
following result stems from the straightforward comparison between kssM and
kssSP at x(0) = 1 :
Lemma 2 At t = 0; the optimal instantaneous investment is larger under
social planning than under monopoly, for all admissible values of fs ; ½g :
That is, the social incentive towards investment in product development
is initially larger than the monopolist’s. Moreover:
I. For all s 2 [0 ; ½2] ; neither the planner nor the monopolist invest in
product innovation, and xSP (t) = xM(t) = 1 forever.
II. For all s 2
µ
½2 ;
3
2
½2
¸
; the planner carries out R&D for product
innovation, thereby obtaining xssSP 2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
; while the monopolist does not
invest.
III. For all
s 2
Ã
3
2
½2 ; min
(
8½2 + 1
4
;
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
;
5
4
)#
;
we have the following cases:
15
A] If ½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
; then min
(
8½2 + 1
4
;
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
;
5
4
)
=
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
and xssi 2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
; mssi 2 (0 ; xssi ) ; i =M;SP :
Partial market coverage obtains under both regimes.
Moreover, if ½ 2 [0 ; 0:3067) ; then
1
2
< xssM < x
ss
SP < 1 for all s 2
Ã
3
2
½2 ;
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
#
: (44)
That is, there exists a subset of parameters where the monopolist lo-
cates closer to the middle of linear city than the planner does.
B] If ½ ¸
p
2
2
; then min
(
8½2 + 1
4
;
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
;
5
4
)
=
5
4
and
1
2
< xssSP < x
ss
M < 1 for all s 2
µ
3
2
½2 ;
5
4
¸
and all ½ ¸
p
2
2
: (45)
That is, in this parameter range, the planner works out a product
design that …ts the tastes of the median (and average) consumer better
than the product supplied by the monopolist.
IV. If
s 2
"
min
(
8½2 + 1
4
;
24½2 + 1¡
p
16½2 + 1
8
;
5
4
)
;
max
(
8½2 + 1
4
;
24½2 + 1¡
p
16½2 + 1
8
;
5
4
)!
;
the following cases arise:
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A] If ½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
; then s 2
"
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
;
5
4
!
and
½
xssM =
1
2
; kssM > 0
¾
;½
xssSP 2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
; kssSP = 0
¾
: This situation is described in …gure 2.
Figure 2 : Comparative dynamics in the space (x(t); k(t)) ,
½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
:
6
- x(t)0
1/2
k(t)
x(0) = 1xssSP
kssSP (0)
kssM(0)
B] If ½ ¸
p
2
2
; then s 2
"
5
4
;
24½2 + 1¡
p
16½2 + 1
8
!
and
½
xssM 2
µ
1
2
; 1
¸
; kssM = 0
¾
;½
xssSP =
1
2
; kssSP > 0
¾
: This situation is described in …gure 3.
17
Figure 3 : Comparative dynamics in the space (x(t); k(t)) ,
½ ¸
p
2
2
:
6
- x(t)0
1/2
k(t)
x(0) = 1xssM
kssM(0)
kssSP (0)
V. If s ¸ max
(
8½2 + 1
4
;
24½2 + 1¡
p
16½2 + 1
8
;
5
4
)
; then a corner so-
lution obtains in both regimes, with
½
xssi =
1
2
; kssSP ¸ kssM > 0
¾
; i =M;SP:
As a matter of curiosity, it is easy to verify that, when
(
s =
5
4
; ½ =
p
2
2
)
;
the planning optimum and the monopoly optimum coincide at the saddle
point
½
kssi = 0 ; x
ss
i =
1
2
¾
:
The above discussion can be summarised by saying that neither the plan-
ner nor the pro…t-seeking monopolist does necessarily aim at developing the
product variety preferred by the average (and median) consumer located at
1/2. In general, they both reach 1/2 for su¢ciently high levels of the gross
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surplus s (case V). Otherwise, the steady state location of the product de-
pends upon the tradeo¤ between the incentive to locate as close as possible
to the middle of the preference space, so as to (i) extract as much surplus as
possible, in the monopoly case, and (ii) minimise total transportation disu-
tility, under social planning; and the incentive to save on R&D costs. In
particular, the conventional wisdom associated with static models (Spence,
1975; Bonanno, 1987), maintaining that the benevolent planner cares about
the average consumer, does not carry over to the present dynamic analysis.
Indeed, the planner may not produce the variety preferred by the average
consumer, as long as market coverage is su¢ciently large. That is, there
are situations where the R&D investment needed to reach 1/2 is socially too
costly. This is the case if
½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
and
min
(
8½2 + 1
4
;
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
;
5
4
)
=
24½2 + 1¡ p16½2 + 1
8
:
On the contrary, under the same conditions, the monopolist …nds it con-
venient to locate at 1/2 so as to maximise the extraction of surplus from
consumers. This also implies the following corollary:
Corollary 3 Whenever xssM < xssSP ; the extent of market coverage at the
steady state is larger under monopoly than under social planning.
Nevertheless, it is obviously true that welfare is higher under planning
than under monopoly, because of a smaller R&D e¤ort in product innovation.
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5 Product development under full market cov-
erage
5.1 Socially optimal R&D
Under full market coverage, the benevolent planner aims at minimising the
integral of transportation costs net of R&D costs, under the kinematics of
location as in (10). Accordingly, the relevant Hamiltonian is:
H(t) = e¡½t ¢
½
x(t)¡ [x(t)]2 ¡ 1
3
¡ ½k(t)¡ ¸(t) k(t)
1 + k(t)
¢ x(t)
¾
; (46)
with the following optimality conditions:
@H(t)
@k(t)
= ¡½ ¡ ¸(t)
[1 + k(t)]2
¢ x(t) = 0 ; (47)
¡@H(t)
@x(t)
=
@¯(t)
@t
) @¸(t)
@t
=
·
½+
k(t)
1 + k(t)
¸
¸(t)¡ 1 + 2x(t) ; (48)
lim
t!1
¯(t) ¢ x(t) = 0 : (49)
From (47), I can establish that
¸(t) = ¡½ [1 + k(t)]
2
x(t)
; (50)
k(t) = ¡1 + 1p
½
p
¡¸(t)x(t) ; (51)
which entails:
@k(t)
@t
_ ¡@¸(t)
@t
x(t)¡ @x(t)
@t
¸(t) : (52)
Using (48) and (50), (52) rewrites as:
@k(t)
@t
_ ½2 [1 + k(t)]2 ¡ x(t) [2x(t)¡ 1] : (53)
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The roots of the r.h.s. expression in (53) are:
k(t) = ¡1§
p
x(t) [2x(t)¡ 1]
½
: (54)
Obviously I can disregard the negative solution, the steady state investment
being:
kssSP = ¡1 +
p
x(t) [2x(t)¡ 1]
½
>
=
<
0 for x(t)
>
=
<
1 +
p
8½+ 1
4
: (55)
Notice that
1 +
p
8½+ 1
4
2
·
1
2
; 1
¶
for all ½ 2 [0 ; 1) : (56)
This entails that, if ½ ¸ 1; the R&D investment in product innovation is
socially too costly for the planner to undertake it at all. Indeed, at x(0) = 1;
we have kssSP = ¡1 + 1=½ < 0 for all ½ ¸ 1:
The phase diagram is qualitatively the same as in …gure 1, and therefore
it is omitted. The above discussion leads to the following:9
Proposition 3 Under full market coverage, the social planner reaches a
steady state at
xssSP =
1 +
p
8½+ 1
4
2
·
1
2
; 1
¶
for all ½ 2 [0 ; 1) :
For all ½ ¸ 1; the planner does not invest and remains at x(0) = 1 forever.
9The stability analysis is omitted here as well as in the next section. In both cases,
equilibria are saddles.
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5.2 Optimal R&D in a pro…t-seeking monopoly
The monopolists maximises net discounted pro…ts, under the dynamic con-
straint (10). Accordingly, the monopolist’s Hamiltonian is:
H(t) = e¡½t ¢
½
s¡ [x(t)]2 ¡ ½k(t)¡ ¸(t) k(t)
1 + k(t)
¢ x(t)
¾
; (57)
with the following optimality conditions:
@H(t)
@k(t)
= ¡½ ¡ ¸(t)
[1 + k(t)]2
¢ x(t) ; (58)
¡@H(t)
@x(t)
=
@¯(t)
@t
) @¸(t)
@t
=
·
½+
k(t)
1 + k(t)
¸
¸(t) + 2x(t) ; (59)
lim
t!1
¯(t) ¢ x(t) = 0 : (60)
As the monopolist’s problem largely replicates the planner’s, I can quickly
outline the solution. The optimal value of ¸(t) is de…ned as in (50), while
the state variable evolves according to the same dynamics as in (52), which
in this case can be written as follows:
@k(t)
@t
_ ½2 [1 + k(t)]2 ¡ 2 [x(t)]2 : (61)
The roots of the r.h.s. expression in (61) are:
k(t) = ¡1§ x(t)
p
2
½
: (62)
As in the planner’s case, the negative solution can be disregarded, the steady
state investment being:
kssM = ¡1 +
x(t)
p
2
½
>
=
<
0 for x(t)
>
=
<
½
p
2
2
: (63)
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Notice that
½
p
2
2
2
·
1
2
; 1
¶
for all ½ 2
"p
2
2
;
p
2
!
: (64)
This entails that, if ½ ¸ p2; the monopolist …nds it too costly to invest in
product development, with kssM = ¡1+
p
2
½
at x(0) = 1: For all ½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
;
the monopolist reaches xssM =
1
2
at kssM = ¡1 +
p
2
2½
> 0:
The above discussion is summarised in the following:
Proposition 4 Under full market coverage, the pro…t-seeking monopolist
reaches a steady state at
xssM =
½
p
2
2
2
·
1
2
; 1
¶
for all ½ 2
"p
2
2
;
p
2
!
;
xssM =
1
2
for all ½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
:
For all ½ ¸ p2; the planner does not invest and remains at x(0) = 1 forever.
6 Planning vs monopoly under full market
coverage
First of all, compare kssSP against k
ss
M at x(0) = 1: This immediately produces
the following result:
Lemma 3 At t = 0; the optimal instantaneous investment is larger under
monopoly than under social planning, for all admissible values of fs ; ½g :
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Then, by virtue of Propositions 3 and 4, I can establish the following
taxonomy:
I. For all ½ ¸ p2 ; neither the planner nor the monopolist invest in
product innovation, and xSP (t) = xM(t) = 1 forever.
II. For all ½ 2 ¡1 ; p2¢ ; the monopolist reaches a steady state at xssM =
½
p
2
2
2
·
1
2
; 1
¶
while the planner remains at x(0) = 1:
III. For all ½ 2
"p
2
2
; 1
!
; both the planner and the monopolist reach a
steady state at xssi 2
·
1
2
; 1
¶
; i =M;SP; with xssM < x
ss
SP :
IV. For all ½ 2
"
0 ;
p
2
2
!
; xssM = x
ss
SP =
1
2
; where xssM is a corner solution
with kssM > 0:
The above taxonomy entails that, for all ½ ¸ 0 and all x(t) 2
·
1
2
; 1
¸
;
kssM > k
ss
SP : This leads to the …nal proposition:
Proposition 5 Under full market coverage, the monopolist’s incentive to
carry out product development is always larger than the planner’s incentive.
The above result can be given an intuitive explanation on the following
grounds. Under full coverage, the monopolist gets always closer to the aver-
age (and median) consumer than the planner does, because this enhances the
monopolist’s ability to extract surplus from any consumers. On the contrary,
in choosing the socially optimal investment path, the planner must tradeo¤
the reduction in transportation costs against the R&D costs, with total de-
mand being …xed at one anyway. Indeed, the planner locates at 1/2 if and
only if ½ = 0; that is, discounting and the rental price of capital are both nil.
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7 Concluding remarks
I have investigated the optimal R&D investment in product innovation of a
single-product …rm operating in a spatial market with a uniform consumer
distribution, comparing the steady state behaviour of a pro…t-seeking monop-
olist versus that of a benevolent social planner. This has been done under
the alternative assumptions of partial and full market coverage.
The main results emerging in the partial coverage setting can be sum-
marised as follows. Neither the planner nor the pro…t-seeking monopolist
does necessarily aim at developing the product variety preferred by the av-
erage (and median) consumer located at 1/2. In general, this obtains only
when consumer’s gross surplus is su¢ciently large. Otherwise, the steady
state product design is the outcome of the tradeo¤ between the incentive
to locate as close as possible to the middle of the preference space, and the
incentive to save upon R&D costs.
This implies that the established wisdom associated with static models
(Spence, 1975; Bonanno, 1987), according to which a planner takes into
account the average consumer, does not hold true in a dynamic setup. Indeed,
the planner may not produce the variety preferred by the average consumer,
in situations where the R&D investment needed to reach 1/2 is socially too
costly. Accordingly, in those situations where the monopolist’s variety is
closer to the average consumer taste than the planner’s, the extent of market
coverage is larger under monopoly than under social planning. Therefore,
welfare maximisation is reached by the planner through a reduction in the
R&D expenditure as compared to monopoly.
The above results are reinforced under full market coverage. If all con-
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sumers buy, the planner’s incentive to innovate is always weaker than the
monopolist’s, and the planner produces the average (and median) consumer’s
preferred variety if and only if the rental price of capital and the discount
rate are both nil.
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